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Cyberspace Property Rights: Private Property 




Under youtube’s terms of use, it owns most content on its webpage and may 
remove content that it deems inappropriate “at any time, without prior notice and 
at its sole discretion.”1 Imagine YouTube’s reaction if the government mandates 
service providers remove content from its webpage without YouTube’s consent.2 
Then also imagine the alternative scenario where a court strikes down YouTube’s 
Terms of Use as a violation of a state constitution, mandating that YouTube repost 
a user’s video it removed without prior notice.3 Such situations are not entirely 
hypothetical, and they certainly are not far-fetched.4 In fact YouTube has had 
recent—and very public—situations where it complied with a government-
sanctioned demand to remove certain politically charged videos, prompting the 
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 1. YouTube, Terms of Service, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).  
 2. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2006) (mandating that a service provider of online material will not 
be liable for copyright infringement if “upon notification of claimed infringement . . . [it] responds 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of 
infringing activity”). 
 3. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79, 88 (1980) (holding that a state may 
exercise its police powers to extend civil liberties to include the right to freedom of speech in privately owned 
areas of a public character). 
 4. See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 
1165–66 (2005) (“Following California’s lead [in decisions like Pruneyard], states should interpret their own 
constitutions’ free speech clauses to grant individuals the right to express themselves in privately-owned forums 
for expression that are the functional equivalent of traditional public forums.”). Professor Nunziato argues that 
the Supreme Court’s holding in PruneYard is illustrative of the positive effect that state action to regulate private 
property could have on the freedom of speech. Id. 
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user who posted the videos to insist that YouTube replace them on the webpage.5 
Government action to regulate the content of Internet webpages could tread heavily 
on the private property interests of website providers6 such as YouTube.7 
The property problem arises because the Internet, including its webpages, has 
many characteristics of a public area, like a shopping mall, so a government could 
exercise its police powers to regulate the content of an Internet webpage even if it is 
controlled by a private entity. The United States Supreme Court’s holding in 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins8 is particularly relevant to this problem. There, 
the Court addressed whether a state could interpret its constitution to protect the 
dissemination of politically charged pamphlets by high school students in a 
privately owned shopping mall.9 Ultimately, the Court found that a state may 
exercise its police powers to extend its citizens’ civil liberties.10 The Court’s holding, 
however, did not necessitate compensation to the mall-owner under the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause11 because the mall-owner’s reasonable business 
expectations were not sufficiently affected.12 The Court’s holding embodies a 
potential dilemma for website providers: by allowing states to exercise their police 
powers to regulate private property of a public character, the constitutionally 
protected property rights of a website provider may be in danger.13 
 
 5. See generally Letter from Trevor Potter, General Counsel, McCain-Palin Campaign, to Chad Hurley, 
CEO, YouTube, L.L.C. et al. (Oct. 13, 2008) (available at http://www.eff.org/files/McCain%20 YouTube% 
20copyright%20letter%2010.13.08.pdf). The user’s request—the re-posting of campaign videos removed 
subsequent to takedown notices—sounded in the freedom of speech, stating that YouTube’s immediate 
compliance with the demands of potential copyright holders “deprives the public of the ability to freely and 
easily view and discuss the most popular political videos of the day.” Id. at 1. In fact, Mr. Potter specifically 
quoted a federal district court judge: “The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political 
expression in order to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.” Id. at 3 (quoting Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen 
Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D.N.H. 1978)).  
 6. The First Amendment rights of the website provider itself are outside the scope of this Article, but such 
an argument should make for an interesting issue. See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, First 
Amendment Protection Afforded to Web Site Operators, 30 A.L.R. 6TH 299 (2008). This Article instead focuses 
upon private property interests of website providers. 
 7. In the context of this Article, “website provider” or “provider” means the individual or entity that 
creates a webpage, while “Internet user” or “user” generally refers to individuals or entities that access and surf 
the content of webpages.  
 8. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 9. Id. at 79. 
 10. Id. at 78–79. 
 11. Id. at 84. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part, “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 12. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82–83 (“There is nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from 
prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a shopping 
center.”). 
 13. Some scholars argue that states should interpret their respective constitutions to extend individuals’ 
rights to express themselves on private property. See, e.g., Nunziato, supra note 4, at 1165–66. 
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Certainly, one state should not control the content of the Internet,14 especially if 
the webpage on which that content appears is the private property of a website 
provider. If a state attempts to regulate a webpage, the constitutional property 
rights of the website provider are abridged,15 so the question arises of how much 
control the website provider has over its own webpage when weighed against the 
state’s interest in regulating the webpage. This Article examines one answer to that 
question: individual website providers have full private property interests in their 
respective webpages, with the rights to use, dispose of, and exclude others from 
their virtual space as they see fit. 
Where a court recognizes a government’s ability to regulate the content of 
privately owned property, like webpages, the analysis necessarily involves the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.16 Website providers likely have strong 
interests in maintaining the right to use, control, and exclude others from the 
content of their webpages, particularly in the context of commercial enterprises.17 
When a government mandates modification of a webpage, a taking should be 
recognized due to the possibility of interference with the economic and personal 
value of certain webpages.18 
Whether a state government may regulate webpages in light of the Supreme 
Court’s holding in PruneYard has yet to be decided, but the question raises 
important issues that courts will face as governments seek to regulate the content of 
the Internet with more frequency. Part II of this Article addresses how the common 
law impliedly extends private property rights to the context of the Internet. 
Specifically, Part II analyzes how courts have found causes of action, such as 
trespass to chattels and conversion, to be applicable to disputes in cyberspace to 
implement the public policies of property rights on the Internet, even where the 
elements are only marginally met. Lastly, Part III of this Article addresses the 
application of PruneYard to the context of the Internet in light of the frequent 
comparisons of cyberspace to physical space when applying modern legal concepts. 
 
 14. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 525 (2003) (observing that the 
Internet is very different from the physical world because of the “automatic interconnection between data 
offered by different people in different places”). 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82–84; see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004–05 (1984) 
(describing a three-factor test to determine “whether a governmental action has gone beyond ‘regulation’ and 
effects a ‘taking’”). In Ruckelshaus, Monsanto brought a suit to protect data, which a federal statute required to 
be disclosed to the EPA. 467 U.S. at 998–99. Monsanto alleged that the federal statute compelling data 
disclosure constituted a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Court 
held that Monsanto had a cognizable interest in its intangible property, data, which is protected by the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause. Id. at 1003–04. In analyzing Monsanto’s claim for an unconstitutional taking, the 
Court identified three relevant factors: the character of the government action, the action’s economic impact on 
the property owner, and the action’s interference with the reasonable business expectations of the property 
owner. Id. at 1005. 
 17. See generally Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005 (focusing on Monsanto’s “reasonable investment-backed 
expectation” to analyze whether the regulation violated the Takings Clause).  
 18. See infra Part III.C.2. 
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Part III also discusses the ramifications of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause if 
website providers have private property interests in their webpages. 
II. Websites Are Pivate Intangible Property Due to the Public 
Policies Behind Common Law Property Causes of Action 
 
Public policies realized by common law favor recognition of a website provider’s 
private property interest in its webpage. To recognize a taking where the 
government regulates a webpage,19 a court must determine that it is intangible 
property20 because a webpage is not tangible, as it does not have or possess physical 
form.21 Further, the Takings Clause is violated where the government regulates 
intangible property for public use without just compensation.22 Thus, courts will 
first have to consider the public policies of recognizing a new intangible property 
right in an Internet webpage in order to find a violation of the Takings Clause from 
government regulation. 
While such intangible property rights on the Internet are not universally 
accepted,23 some courts have found that disputes in cyberspace fit into private 
property causes of action.24 Judicial treatment of two causes of action, (1) trespass to 
 
 19. Webpages are “simple text file[s] that contain[] not only text, but also a set of . . . [instructions] that 
describe how the text should be formatted when a browser displays it on the screen.” Marshall Brain, How Web 
Pages Work, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/web-page1.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 
2010); see also Astroworks, Inc. v. Astroexhibit, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 609, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (referring to a 
webpage as “an idea reduced to practice” in the context of discussing conversion of intellectual property). While 
webpages are intimately connected to their servers and domain names, courts and legislatures have not 
definitively declared yet that they are the private property of the website provider.  
 20. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003–04. 
 21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1219 (8th ed. 2005) (defining tangible as “having or possessing physical 
form”); see also CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1024 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (“The 
Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller 
groups of linked computer networks.”). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”). 
 23. See, e.g., America Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89, 96 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
“instructions, data, and information” on computers are not tangible property); Universal Tube & Rollform 
Equip. Corp. v. YouTube, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 260, 269 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (denying a claim that the domain 
name youtube.com constituted a trespass to plaintiff’s chattel, utube.com, because plaintiff could not link the 
intangible domain name to a physical object (i.e., computer) since a third party’s computers hosted plaintiff’s 
website); Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86 (Va. 2000) (finding that a domain 
name confers a “contractual right to use a unique domain name for a specified period of time” and demurring a 
decision on whether a domain name is a form of intellectual property). 
 24. See, e.g., Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2003) (analogizing common law private 
property principles to domain-name disputes to avoid a “free-for-all” among the parties); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s 
Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding a strong likelihood that eBay would prevail on 
the merits of a trespass to chattels claim where defendant sent electronic signals to eBay’s computer system in 
order to mine information); America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451–52 (E.D. Va. 1998) 
(holding that sending unauthorized messages through AOL’s computer systems constituted a trespass of 
chattels); see also Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Techs., LLC, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1287–88 (D. Utah 2009) 
(finding, in dicta, that a webpage is tangible property capable of conversion).  
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chattels and (2) conversion, serves as a good illustration of the public policies 
behind recognition of property rights in a webpage. This Part does not argue that 
regulating a webpage under all circumstances constitutes a trespass or conversion.25 
It instead examines the public policies and legal theories some courts have advanced 
for recognition of private property interests on the Internet and argues that those 
policies are applicable in the context of a webpage. 
A. Trespass to Chattels: Policies in Favor of Property Interests in Webpages, Despite 
Trespass to Chattel’s Imperfect Application in Cyberspace 
  
Courts have not decided whether webpages are property,26 but some have 
determined that website servers constitute the property of the website provider 
under the doctrine of trespass to chattels. The Internet is connected to physical 
objects, such as website servers,27 and website providers have legitimate business 
interests in excluding others from their virtual space. As a result, courts have 
applied the policies behind the trespass to chattels doctrine28 to grant website 
providers property rights in the context of the Internet, even where the elements of 
the cause of action are only marginally met.29 
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an individual commits trespass to 
chattels by intentionally: “(a) dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or 
intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another.”30 The use of the word 
“or” means that the plaintiff may prove either that the defendant dispossesses him 
of the property or at least intermeddles with it.31 By its very nature, a website is 
simultaneously accessible by a large number of people,32 so a single Internet user 
 
 25. It should be noted that if websites are not property, the analysis will take a much different turn. See 
generally Network Solutions, 529 S.E.2d at 86–87 (declining to decide whether a domain name is a form of 
intellectual property and noting that extending a garnishment action to domain names would incite a slippery 
slope of actions for garnishment of services). If domain names are property, however, whether they constitute 
private or public property may be the essential determination for the court considering the property rights of 
the website provider. See generally infra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
 26. But see Margae, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 1286–88 (stating, in dicta, that webpages are property and thus 
capable of being converted). 
 27. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First Amendment Catch-22, 75 
TUL. L. REV. 87, 93–94 (2000) (citing Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant: How the Federal Government 
Created Microsoft, Personal Computers, and the Internet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1, 44 (1999)).  
 28. See Bidder’s Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 (describing a trespass to chattels action). 
 29. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 35 (2000) (noting a 
lack of commonsense in finding that a “loss of computer processing cycles” is sufficient to show impairment in 
a trespass claim). But see Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 303–04 (Cal. 2003) (holding that there was no 
evidence that the plaintiff in a trespass to chattels claim had been “dispossessed of its computer, nor did [the 
defendant’s] messages prevent [the plaintiff] from using its computers for any measurable length of time”).  
 30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965). 
 31. See id. 
 32. See generally Lemley, supra note 14, at 526 (“While there are some constraints on simultaneous usage of 
a website or the Internet itself, for most users and for most purposes bandwidth is effectively infinite.”).  
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likely does not dispossess the website provider of its webpage. However, courts may 
find intermeddling in the context of the Internet through an analysis of electronic 
access.33 
Some district courts agree that access to a website server constitutes 
intermeddling with the physical property of another, even though no physical 
touching occurs.34 Bidder’s Edge, for example, involved the defendant’s un-
authorized use of a “software robot,” which is a computer program that functions 
throughout the Internet to gather information on others’ webpages.35 Despite the 
plaintiff’s requests for the defendant to cease its activities, the defendant in Bidder’s 
Edge used the robot to “crawl” the plaintiff’s website to compile information for 
inclusion in its own database.36 The district court held that trespass to chattels is 
actionable where there is an “intentional interference” with the possessory interest 
of another’s personal property.37 The court found that electronic signals sent by an 
individual to gather information from another’s server or computer system are 
tangible enough to support the plaintiff’s trespass action.38 The district court found 
an actionable trespass even where the plaintiff did not allege that it would suffer 
physical damage to its computer systems or that it would lose any revenue.39 
For the tort of trespass to chattels to be actionable, some harm or impairment to 
the chattel must occur.40 When analyzing the harm element, courts consider 
whether the intermeddling “diminishes the condition, quality[,] or value of 
 
 33. See generally Bidder’s Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 (discussing “intentional interference” with a chattel 
by sending unwanted electronic signals).  
 34. Compare CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997) 
(finding that spam-like mass emails sent by the defendant over the plaintiff’s computer network were 
sufficiently tangible to constitute an actionable trespass, despite the fact that they were electronic messages), 
with America Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89, 96 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
“instructions, data, and information are abstract and intangible, and damage to them is not physical damage to 
tangible property”).  
 35. Bidder’s Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.  
 36. Id. at 1062.  
 37. Id. at 1069.  
 38. Id. Similarly, in LCGM the district court found that an actionable trespass occurred where the 
defendant intentionally accessed the plaintiff’s computers and computer network to send spam, viewing the 
computers and network as the property upon which the defendant trespassed. America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, 
Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (E.D. Va. 1998).   
 39. Bidder’s Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (“The quality or value of personal property may be ‘diminished 
even though it is not physically damaged by defendant’s conduct.’” (quoting CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber 
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997)). 
 40. See generally Ned Snow, Accessing the Internet Through the Neighbor’s Wireless Internet Connection: 
Physical Trespass in Virtual Reality, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1226, 1244–46 (2006) (discussing potential ways to satisfy 
the requisite harm in a trespass to chattels claim for Wi-Fi joyriding); see also Mathew Bierlein, Policing the 
Wireless World: Access Liability in the Open Wi-Fi Era, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1123, 1146 (2006) (noting that even if 
courts extend doctrine of trespass to chattels to “electronic conduct,” establishing damages “remain[s] a 
pressing concern”). 
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personal property.”41 Intermeddling in the context of cyberspace could give rise to 
two possible harms: (1) the transmittal of viruses; or (2) decreased website server or 
computer system performance.42 
Neither of these possible harms has been met with any firm acceptance by 
scholars or courts. While transmittal of a computer virus can cause a website’s value 
to decrease where the virus spreads to other computers or networks in contact with 
it,43 such occurrences are rare and may not cause physical harm.44 Similarly, a lower 
rate of website server or computer system performance is a complicated and highly 
contested matter. Heavy traffic on a webpage may cause the webpage to load more 
slowly for other users, having the effect of chilling visitors to a website,45 but such an 
argument is tenuous. It has been frequently met with negative reaction from 
scholars46 and courts.47 
While some courts have accepted the possibility that harm may be found where 
an electronic touching occurs,48 a finding of harm is not necessary to the 
recognition of private property interests in webpages for purposes of a taking. 
Instead, “[a]ll legal property rights, whether tangible or intangible, are born of 
important policy considerations.”49 One must consider these public policies in order 
to determine that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause protects website providers’ 
property interest in their webpages. 
 
 41. Bidder’s Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071; see also CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022 (“Harm to the 
personal property or diminution of its quality, condition, or value as a result of defendants’ use can also be the 
predicate for liability.”).  
 42. See generally Snow, supra note 40, at 1244. 
 43. See id. at 1246 (discussing the devaluation of a wireless Internet router when a virus is transmitted 
through it to the Wi-Fi operator’s network).  
 44. See generally Bidder’s Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (finding that trespass to chattels is actionable only if 
the “defendant’s unauthorized use [of the plaintiff’s computer system] proximately resulted in damage to 
plaintiff”). 
 45. See Aleksika: Search Engine Marketing, Website Optimization, http://www.aleksika.com/site-
optimization/webpage-load-time/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (“[E]commerce sites are losing $1.1 to $1.3 billion 
in revenue each year due to customer click-away caused by slow loading websites.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Burk, supra note 29, at 35 (“[T]he court found a diminution in value from the loss of 
computer processing cycles and the use of computer memory required to handle the bulk e-mail messages. No 
matter that the e-mail messages processed by the recipient systems were precisely the type of communications 
the equipment was meant to process . . . .”). 
 47. See, e.g., Universal Tube & Rollform Equip. Corp. v. YouTube, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263, 268–69 
(N.D. Ohio 2007) (dismissing the plaintiff’s trespass to chattels claim, despite the plaintiff’s allegation that the 
defendant caused thousands of visitors to access the plaintiff’s website, which caused its web servers to crash 
several times); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 303–04 (Cal. 2003) (holding that there was no evidence that 
the plaintiff in a trespass to chattels claim had been “dispossessed of its computers, nor did Hamidi’s messages 
prevent Intel from using its computers for any measurable length of time”). 
 48. See, e.g., CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997) 
(finding a harm in a trespass claim because “defendants’ multitudinous electronic mailings demand the disk 
space and drain the processing power of plaintiff’s computer equipment,” which make those resources 
unavailable to the plaintiff’s subscribers). 
 49. Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 29 (2005).  
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Several courts have found the presence of protectable interests in trespass to 
chattels cases, even where the harm occurs to something other than the physical 
object being electronically touched.50 In CompuServe, for example, the district court 
found that the elements of the Restatement (Second) of Torts were met where “the 
plaintiff’s business reputation and goodwill with its customers” were harmed.51 This 
conclusion seems to contradict the language of the Restatement because the 
comments make clear that the main purpose of the harm requirement is to protect 
the “possessor’s materially valuable interest in the physical condition, quality, or 
value of the chattel.”52 The CompuServe court focused instead on the vaguer 
language that the possessor may safeguard his “legally protected interest” by use of 
reasonable force against harmless interference with his possession.53 Thus, the 
public policy behind the district court’s analysis in CompuServe was to protect 
property rights in cyberspace due to their effect on business expectations stemming 
from the Internet.54 
Private property interests in Internet webpages should be similarly protected in 
the future. Property rights are the products of policies, such as maintaining the 
legitimate business practices of commercial enterprises, whether they are individual 
or collective efforts.55 Website providers should be able to use, possess, and dispose 
of their webpages in any manner they see fit as a general function of the classic 
definition of property interests.56 This has been a basic utility of the concept of 
property since property rights first began to take shape in American law.57 Website 
providers have particular and unique interests in seeing the data files that make up 
its webpage arranged in a certain way on users’ computer screens.58 While many 
website providers may have personal or social motivations for creating a webpage, 
providers of online businesses especially have a need for property rights in their 
webpages. Government regulation of webpages would directly impede on those 
motivations because providers would be unable to arrange their webpages as they 
 
 50. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (lending 
credence to the plaintiff’s claim that it could not use its own servers for its own purposes due to the defendant’s 
excessive usage of its bandwidth capacity); America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (E.D. 
Va. 1998) (recognizing injury to plaintiff’s possessory interest in its computer equipment and injury to its 
business goodwill as a result of defendant’s trespass). 
 51. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1023. 
 52. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 218 cmt. e (1965)).  
 53. Id.  
 54. See id. 
 55. See Mossoff, supra note 49, at 33.  
 56. Id. at 40.  
 57. See id. at 33 (explaining that preeminent property law cases demonstrate the “basic truth” that “every 
tangible property entitlement . . . implicates the same questions about utility, personal dignity, and freedom”); 
see also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823) (examining the transfer of land from the Native 
Americans to the first settlers); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (discussing property in the 
context of wild animal hunts).  
 58. See Brain, supra note 19 (defining “webpages” as “simple text file[s] that [contain] not only text, but 
also a set of [instructions] that describe how the text should be formatted when a browser displays it on the 
screen”). 
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see fit. Recognition of the basic intangible property right in an Internet webpage 
would allow website providers to protect their interests, business or otherwise, as a 
matter of public policy. 
Due to these policies on the Internet, many courts have recognized property 
interests even where the cause of action does not perfectly match-up with the facts 
of the case. The trespass to chattels cause of action does not provide a perfect 
avenue for a website provider to sue anyone it does not want to regulate its 
webpage. Instead, courts that have addressed trespass to chattels claims have 
recognized the property interests of individuals and entities on the Internet to 
implement policies such as facilitation of business and commerce in cyberspace.59 
Website providers should be able to virtually exercise property rights on their 
webpages for the very same policy reasons. 
B. Conversion: Website Providers’ Exercise of Exclusive Control over the Content of 
Their Precisely Defined Webpages 
 
Although courts have not determined that webpages themselves may be converted, 
one court has recognized that a domain name may be the premise for the action of 
conversion.60 A property interest in a domain name is particularly relevant to the 
analysis of whether websites are private property because a webpage is intimately 
connected to the domain name.61 While not all courts recognize that a domain 
name is private property,62 the analysis which some courts have used to address the 
subject is helpful to illustrate the property characteristics of webpages. 
To establish conversion of a domain name, the plaintiff must allege and prove 
that (1) it owns or has the right to possess the domain name; (2) someone has 
wrongfully dispossessed it of that property right in the name; and (3) it has suffered 
damages as a result of that disposition.63 Thus, inherent in the first question is 
whether the domain name is personal property.64 Some courts employ a three-part 
test for determining the existence of a property interest, such that there must be: (1) 
the presence of a precisely defined interest, (2) that is capable of exclusive control or 
 
 59. See supra note 24. 
 60. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing a decision rejecting plaintiff’s claim 
for conversion of a domain name). 
 61. Universal Tube & Rollform Equip. Corp. v. YouTube, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 260, 268 (N.D. Ohio 2007) 
(comparing a domain name to “a street address or a telephone number,” and noting that a domain name is 
“without physical substance, and it is therefore impossible to make ‘physical contact’ with it”). A person may 
provide a website, however, without independently registering a domain name by using a free hosting service. 
See Linda Roeder, Name Your Domain and Register It Too, http://personalweb.about.com/od/registeradomain 
name/a/00domain_name.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010). The entity providing the free hosting service would 
thus be the property owner with the right to use, dispose of, and control its webpage. 
 62. See, e.g., Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86–87 (Va. 2000). 
 63. Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1029 (citing G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 
896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992)).  
 64. Id.  
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possession, and (3) in which the alleged owner has a “legitimate claim to 
exclusivity.”65 
Domain names meet the test for determining the existence of a property right.66 
First, they are precisely defined because they are linked to a particular point on the 
Internet and direct Internet users to that point to view the corresponding 
webpage.67 Second, domain names are capable of exclusive control because the 
website provider makes the determination of where the particular virtual point on 
the Internet the webpage should exist.68 With respect to exclusive control, 
moreover, domain names are capable of assignment or sale by the website 
provider.69 Last, website providers have legitimate claims of exclusivity over domain 
names because they are highly valuable, such that many providers will pay top-
dollar to obtain the most recognizable names.70 Indeed, it is the customary practice 
of Internet actors to recognize the claim to exclusivity of the domain name 
registrant.71 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it would seem that domain names are the 
private property of the registrant; however, some courts appear to reject that 
theory.72 In Network Solutions, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed whether 
the contractual right to use a domain name registered to a judgment-debtor may be 
garnished.73 The lower court found that domain names are a form of intellectual 
property and are capable of exclusive possession.74 The appeals court, however, 
determined that “a domain name registration is the product of a contract for 
services between the registrar and registrant” because of the dependency that 
 
 65. Id. at 1030 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rasmussen, 958 F.2d at 903). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.; see also Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Techs., LLC, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1288 (D. Utah 2009) (stating, 
in dicta, that a webpage is tangible property that is capable of being converted). 
 68. Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030; see also Zurakov v. Register.Com, Inc., 304 A.D.2d 176, 179 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2003).  
[T]he benefit to plaintiff of his contract with defendant would be rendered illusory if the effect of 
registering the domain name in his name were merely to have the domain name placed next to his 
name in some official record . . . and not to grant him exclusive use and control of it.  
Zurakov, 304 A.D.2d at 179. 
 69. Ned Snow, The Constitutional Failing of the Anticybersquatting Act, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 48 
(2005).  
 70. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030; see also Ki Mae Heussner, The Top 10 Most Expensive Domain Names, 
ABCNEWS.COM, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/AheadoftheCurve/story?id=7014819&page=1 (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2010) (reporting that Toys ‘R’ Us purchased the domain name toys.com for $5.1 million). 
 71. See generally Zurakov, 304 A.D.2d at 179 (“With respect to whether the contract conferred upon 
plaintiff the exclusive right to control his newly registered domain name, the custom and usage of [the] 
‘registration’ of a domain name in the Internet context is certainly more relevant than the literal definition of 
‘registration’ found in the dictionary.”). In fact, domain names are even subject to in rem jurisdiction. Kremen, 
337 F.3d at 1030.  
 72. See supra note 23. 
 73. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 81 (Va. 2000). 
 74. Id. at 86. 
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“operational Internet addresses” have on the registrar’s services.75 Because the 
higher court found that the registration of a domain name was a service, it refused 
to extend garnishment proceedings to a contract for that service to avoid a slippery 
slope where other services would become subject to such proceedings.76 
Despite the interconnection of a domain name and a webpage, the holding of 
Network Solutions might not be inconsistent with the notion that an Internet 
webpage is private property. Some scholars lament that the holding in Network 
Solutions forecloses the idea of recognition of a property right in the domain name 
itself.77 The counterargument to the holding in Network Solutions is based on the 
idea that the ultimate value of the domain name is determined from the 
marketability of the name, which is independent from the value of the service of 
registering a domain name.78 Because some domain names are worth more than 
others, but the price for the registrar’s service of assigning the name to the 
purchaser stays the same for everyone, the registrar basically “sells more than just 
the rights to the registrar’s services.”79 While domain names certainly are valuable 
virtual locations, the registrant’s economic interest in the domain name really 
develops when a website provider creates a webpage at the location.80 Under this 
theory, the webpage is likewise consistent with personal private property because 
the website provider pays top-dollar for its virtual location and then invests more 
time and finances to develop the webpage itself. 
The proprietary characteristic of a webpage under the Kremen factors is based 
around its marketability and manipulability. Like domain names,81 webpages are 
precise virtual locations on the Internet,82 the confines of which are capable of visual 
definition. Also, webpages are exclusively controlled by the website provider.83 
Website providers, such as AOL, Yahoo, and even colleges and universities, have the 
capability of removing objectionable content, prohibiting users from making vulgar 
 
 75. Id. at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d. 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 
1999)). 
 76. Id. at 86–87.  
 77. See, e.g., Snow, supra note 69, at 49 (“By ruling that property rights to a domain name only represent 
the registrant’s rights to the registrar’s services, the Umbro court foreclosed the possibility that a domain name 
could represent a property interest in a thing itself.”). 
 78. Id. at 50–51.  
 79. Id. at 51. 
 80. See generally Jefferson Graham, Google’s AdSense a Bonanza for Some Web Sites, USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 
2005, at 1B (explaining how Google’s AdSense program works and reporting that some website owners make 
thousands of dollars from Adsense alone); Google AdSense, What’s AdSense, http://www.google.com/ 
services/adsense_tour/index.html (last visited Mar. 2 2010) (boasting to website providers: “[g]et paid for 
displaying targeted Google ads on your site”). 
 81. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 82. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 890 (1997) (“Cyberspace undeniably reflects some 
form of geography . . . . Web sites, for example, exist at fixed ‘locations’ on the Internet.”). 
 83. Nunziato, supra note 4, at 1121 (discussing Internet Service Providers’ (ISP) authority to remove 
content that it deems “objectionable” or “inaccurate” (quoting AOL, Community Guidelines, 
http://legal.web.aol.com/aol/aolpol/comguide.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2010))). 
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content available, and contracting with customers for acceptable use.84 Indeed, these 
website providers seek to enhance the value of their webpages through such 
exclusive control. In addition to exclusive control, website providers have a 
legitimate claim to exclusivity of the contents of their webpages because webpages 
may contain copyrighted information and are directly linked to a domain name 
(i.e., valuable gateways to desirable virtual locations).85 
Because webpages are inherently connected to domain names, a website provider 
invests substantial sums of money and effort in its webpage to maximize its 
profitability or otherwise implement its desired use.86 Due to those efforts, the 
website provider “has a right to enjoy the fruits of . . . [its] labors.”87 Courts such as 
the Ninth Circuit in Kremen recognized the policies surrounding the marketability 
of a domain name;88 such policies lend themselves to the recognition of property 
interest in cyberspace. As a result, website providers should have a property interest 
that protects its investments and efforts when they create webpages.89 
Because webpages fit into the various common law definitions of property, 
government regulation of the content on a webpage would burden the website 
provider’s utilization of its property and its right to exclude. Not only do courts 
take great measures to implement policies protecting property rights on the 
Internet in actions such as trespass to chattels, they also recognize that the website 
providers’ investments should be protected in actions such as conversion. With 
these policy considerations in mind, webpages should likewise be recognized as 
private property. 
III. Weighing Property Rights Against Government Regulation in 
the Context of the Internet Website 
 
Government regulation of webpages could overburden a website provider’s 
property rights in its webpages. Notwithstanding those property rights, a state could 
attempt to exercise its police powers to regulate the content of webpages pursuant 
 
 84. Id. at 1121–22. 
 85. See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Mossoff, supra note 49, at 41.  
 88. Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030. 
Registering a domain name is like staking a claim to a plot of land at the title office. It informs 
others that the domain name is the registrant’s and no one else’s. Many registrants also invest 
substantial time and money to develop and promote websites that depend on their domain names. 
Ensuring that they reap the benefits of their investments reduces uncertainty and thus encourages 
investment in the first place, promoting the growth of the Internet overall. 
 Id. 
 89. See Mossoff, supra note 49, at 41 (quoting James Madison’s explanation that the term property 
“embraces everything to which a man may attach a value and have a right”). 
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to PruneYard.90 Such an application is unjustifiable. Not only is PruneYard a limited 
holding,91 traditional physical space doctrines, such as that of the public forum, are 
also not conducive to the context of a webpage due to the difference between 
physical space and cyberspace.92 Because PruneYard should not be extended to allow 
states to freely regulate webpage content under their police powers, the Fifth 
Amendment still provides a viable avenue for a website provider to protect his or 
her property interests in a webpage.93 
A. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins: Factual Background and Analysis 
  
Fred Sahadi privately owned the PruneYard Shopping Center, which was a mall 
open to the public for attracting patrons to the commercial enterprises within its 
confines.94 PruneYard had a nondiscriminatory—yet strict—policy against the 
public expressive activities of any lessee or patron.95 The policy specifically 
prohibited the distribution of petitions, unless they were directly related to the 
commercial purposes of the mall.96 
One weekend, several students from a nearby high school set up a table in the 
mall’s courtyard where they intended to solicit support for their opposition of an 
international resolution against “Zionism.”97 As mall patrons walked by, the 
students distributed informational pamphlets and requested their signatures on 
petitions.98 Despite the peacefulness of their activities and a lack of objection from 
mall patrons, a mall security guard demanded that they leave the premises, 
suggesting that they move to the public sidewalk near the mall.99 
The students sued to enjoin the mall and Sahadi from excluding them from the 
business premises while they distributed the pamphlets and circulated the 
petitions.100 The trial court refused to issue the injunction based upon the fact that 
there were other “channels of communication” aside from soliciting at PruneYard 
Shopping Center, which was the private property of Sahadi.101 The court of appeals 
affirmed, but the California Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the mall, 
while privately owned, saw the arrival of 25,000 patrons each day and that the 
 
 90. See Nunziato, supra note 4, at 1165–66 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s holding in PruneYard is 
illustrative of the positive effect state action to regulate private property would have on freedom of speech). 
 91. See infra notes 140–44 and accompanying text. 
 92. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 93. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 94. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77 (1980). 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 77–78.  
 Cyberspace Property Rights 
34 Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy 
students’ activities did not disrupt the normal commercial relations of the mall.102 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether a state, 
through its constitution, could negate a private property owner’s right to exclude 
when the property at issue has a uniquely public character.103 
PruneYard and Sahadi argued that Supreme Court precedent104 prevented a state 
from requiring a public shopping center to provide access to citizens exercising 
their First Amendment rights.105 The Court noted that property can certainly 
maintain its private character, even though the owner invites the public onto it for 
commercial purposes.106 According to the Court, that recognition does not limit the 
authority of a state to exercise its police powers to expand the individual liberties 
afforded by the state’s constitution to include freedom of speech in privately owned 
spaces with public characteristics.107 Moreover, PruneYard and Sahadi argued that 
their First Amendment rights had been violated because they were forced to 
accommodate the speech of others.108 The Court determined, however, that 
PruneYard and Sahadi were not compelled by the state or the court to accept the 
view of the high school students; the mall and its owner were free to openly 
disassociate themselves from the students’ political message.109 
PruneYard and Sahadi also argued that their right to exclude was protected by 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment right to 
due process before deprivation of property.110 The Court recognized that “one of the 
essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right to exclude others,” 
acknowledging that there had been a literal taking when the California Supreme 
Court interpreted their State Constitution to entitle the students to freedom of 
speech on the private premises of the mall.111 The Court noted that the 
determination of whether a state law infringes upon a property owner’s property 
interest necessitates a consideration of the state action’s impact on the property 
owner’s reasonable business interests.112 The Court held that PruneYard and Sahadi 
could easily adopt management regulations to minimize the economic impact of 
the students’ activities and that the mall was so physically large that the minor use 
 
 102. Id. at 78. 
 103. Id. at 79. 
 104. PruneYard relied on Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). In Lloyd, the Supreme Court vacated 
an injunction issued by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which prohibited Lloyd Corp. from 
preventing citizens’ right to distribute handbills on Lloyd’s property, a public mall. Id. at 552–53; 570.  
 105. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 80. 
 106. Id. at 81. 
 107. Id. The Court distinguished Pruneyard from Lloyd by noting that in Lloyd, there was no state statutory 
or constitutional provision that affirmatively created rights for citizens to use private property. Id. at 81. By 
contrast, in Pruneyard, the California Constitution affirmatively creates a right for its citizens to exercise “their 
state rights of free expression and petition.” Id. at 80. 
 108. Id. at 85. 
 109. Id. at 87–88. 
 110. Id. at 82. 
 111. Id. at 83.  
 112. Id. at 82–83.  
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of the courtyard by the students would not interfere with its commercial 
purposes.113 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the state 
supreme court’s decision to grant the injunction to the students.114 
B. Application of PruneYard in the Context of Webpages 
A government’s application of PruneYard to regulate the content of Internet 
webpages is unjustifiable. First and foremost, the Internet should not be lightly 
analogized to physical space due to the realities of its technological architecture, 
meaning that doctrines related to physical space, such as the public forum doctrine, 
are inconsistent with webpages. PruneYard is a limited holding, moreover, which 
expressly states that a government’s regulation of private property should not 
amount to a taking, requiring just compensation under the Takings Clause. An 
extension of the Court’s holding would thus lead to a multitude of suits against the 
government for violations of website provider’s private property interests. 
1. The Cyberspace Metaphor: The Public Policies of Addressing Internet Property 
Rights in Terms of Physical Space 
 
Despite the property interest a website provider has in its webpage, some would 
argue that the Internet serves as a gigantic public forum,115 such that the 
government should protect it as part of the public good. As the argument goes, the 
Internet is a marketplace of ideas, much like a shopping mall is a marketplace of 
goods.116 One of the most attractive characteristics of the Internet is the ease and 
efficiency with which information and ideas are disseminated to millions of people 
at once.117 In essence, the Internet is the ultimate medium for public access to 
speech.118 Government regulations could include not only the removal of content, 
but also the mandated addition of content on a webpage.119 The latter situation 
intrudes on the rights of the website provider due to the public policies in favor of 
recognition of the provider’s rights to use, dispose of, and exclude others from their 
virtual space. While some scholars continue to make the public forum argument, 
 
 113. Id. at 83–84. 
 114. Id. at 88. 
 115. See Nunziato, supra note 4, at 1120–21. 
 116. See generally Todd G. Hartman, The Marketplace Vs. the Ideas: The First Amendment Challenges to 
Internet Commerce, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 420 (1999) (discussing the Internet and its impact on the marketplace 
of ideas theory). 
 117. See A Transcript Featuring the 1999-2000 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecturer—Floyd Abrams, 51 MERCER L. 
REV. 833, 845 (2000) [hereinafter Abrams Transcript]. Indeed, that is presumably the reason why private 
businesses buy domain names and post privately owned webpages on them. 
 118. See Nunziato, supra note 4, at 1121. Please note that this Article does not address the “public forum” 
aspect of the First Amendment due to its focus on private property concepts. 
 119. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
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that doctrine was created with physical space in mind and, as such, is not necessarily 
conducive to the concept of an Internet website, which is intangible.120 
While the Internet must be intimately connected to physical objects to 
function,121 it is also an abstract embodiment of electrical transmissions rather than 
a structured physical shape like a house or a car. It is essentially nothing more than 
the exchange of information,122 amounting to an electrical diffusion of data between 
two or more pieces of computerized hardware, which is then made viewable to the 
user in the form of a webpage.123 Accordingly, analyzing the property problems 
associated with webpages through analogies to real property or physical space is not 
the best process for determining the rights of individuals as they relate to webpages. 
Instead, the argument for a government’s regulation of content on a webpage 
should be weighed against the technological realities and public policies 
surrounding the issue.124 
At least two key differences exist between physical space and cyberspace.125 First, 
real property is, by definition, unique land that cannot be copied, whereas data 
transmitted over the Internet must be copied.126 By way of explanation, each time 
someone accesses a webpage, that individual’s computer requests information from 
the website provider’s server.127 The website provider’s data is then sent to the 
individual’s computer and reproduced to form the contents of a webpage.128 While a 
website provider may virtually refuse to accommodate a request under this 
architecture, exclusion in the physical sense does not occur. 
Second, with physical space, individuals can observe through the senses of sight, 
hearing, and smell what is happening around them.129 Indeed, many individuals 
make a hobby of spying on their next-door neighbors. On the other hand, Internet 
websites have no “next door.”130 Cyberspace contains no physical public rest-areas 
such as park benches, sidewalks, or bus stations, where individuals may observe the 
 
 120. See Nunziato, supra note 4, at 1144–48 (describing the development of the public forum doctrine). 
Essentially, the public forum doctrine posits that “government actors are substantially restrained in their ability 
to regulate speech within their ‘property’ when that property constitutes a public forum.” Id. at 1147. Professor 
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order to guarantee the dissemination of speech protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 1160–61. 
 121. See Shih Ray Ku, supra note 27, at 93–94. 
 122. Lemley, supra note 14, at 523. 
 123. Id.; see also Brain, supra note 19 (defining a webpage).  
 124. See generally Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (“The Court . . . has identified 
several factors that should be taken into account when determining whether a governmental action has gone 
beyond ‘regulation’ and effects a ‘taking.’”). Specifically, a court should consider the character of the 
government action, the action’s economic impact on the property owner, and the action’s interference with the 
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 125. See Lemley, supra note 14, at 525–26. 
 126. See id. at 526. 
 127. Id. at 524. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 526.  
 130. Id. 
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behavior of others in the physical sense.131 Even those who argue for the recognition 
of the Internet as a “public forum” for free speech purposes agree that the common 
assumption that there is a cyber “town square” is incorrect.132 For this reason, the 
extension of physical space legal doctrines is not conducive to the Internet because 
of the lack of traditional public areas in cyberspace. 
Conversely, by its very nature, the Internet is the product of a public effort. No 
one would pay for the Internet if there was only one website to visit. In fact, one 
could compare the Internet’s appeal to that of a shopping mall. A person enters the 
mall for the wide range of stores in which to purchase an even wider array of items 
and services. Similarly, millions of websites offer a wide range of options to Internet 
users, which is part of the attraction.133 That appeal brings millions of people 
together on a series of networks, in which they can chat, shop, surf, and learn. 
Against this backdrop, one could readily argue that states should regulate the 
Internet, like other places of a public character, to protect it as a mode of the free 
transfer of ideas across the nation and globe. 
To address that argument, however, one must consider the consequences behind 
its implications. The faults of believing the Internet has a wholly public character 
may be conceptualized by addressing an often-used analogy. Some courts compare 
a domain name to a telephone number or address.134 In the virtual sense, this 
appears to be a worthy metaphor; however, in the practical sense, it is wrong 
because a telephone number or an address connects you to a physical location. A 
domain name transports you only to a virtual location, not a geological 
physicality—even if it is connected to a physical object.135 For instance, a person 
may visit eBay.com, but that person is not in a physical auction house. From a 
practical standpoint, that person is only in his or her own home, seeing only a 
collection of data and information that appears in the form of a webpage.136 
While this criticism of the analogy simply states the obvious, the obvious is often 
overlooked. The website provider is not like a store owner who can physically 
remove unruly customers. Businesses that exist solely on the Internet should not be 
forced to accommodate the free speech of customers with political, religious, or 
social motivations for speaking because that privilege may inhibit an otherwise 
 
 131. Id. But see Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Techs., LLC, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1288 (D. Utah 2009) (stating 
that a webpage is a type of tangible property, capable of conversion, and which “has a physical presence on [a] 
computer drive, causes tangible effects on computers, and can be perceived by the senses”). 
 132. See Nunziato, supra note 4, at 1139. 
 133. Private and public entities alike have registered over 102.5 million domain names worldwide. 
Webhosting.info, Domain Names, http://www.webhosting.info/domains (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). Each of 
these domain names may serve as the virtual location of another privately owned webpage. 
 134. E.g., Universal Tube & Rollform Equip. Corp. v. YouTube, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 260, 268 (N.D. Ohio 
2007).  
 135. See Lemley, supra note 14, at 524 (“People may speak of ‘visiting’ websites, but of course they don’t 
actually do any such thing. They send a request for information to the provider of the website, and the provider 
sends back data: the web page itself.”). 
 136. See supra note 19. 
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legitimate business from operating to its maximized profitability.137 Unlike the 
students in PruneYard who passively administered pamphlets to interested 
passersby,138 Internet users who post information on webpages force other innocent 
Internet users to view the content. These innocent users should be protected from 
information that is potentially harmful or unwanted to the viewer. Because they are 
a captive audience, they should not be subjected to information that did not 
originally attract them to the webpage, especially in the context of commercial 
sites.139 
2. Legal Realities of PruneYard 
A state seeking to exercise its police power to regulate Internet content under an 
extension of PruneYard should also remember that it is a limited holding. 
Specifically, the Court only addressed the situation where an individual state 
expanded the civil liberties of its citizens through the use of its police powers.140 In 
fact, the United States Supreme Court earlier held in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner141 that 
the “essentially private character of a store and its privately owned abutting 
property does not change by virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a 
modern shopping center.”142 The Court in PruneYard expressly distinguished its 
previous holding in Lloyd on the grounds that the Court in Lloyd was not faced with 
a state action to extend the constitutional rights of its citizens.143 The PruneYard 
Court specifically noted, however, that regulations of the state must not amount to 
a taking requiring just compensation under the Takings Clause.144 Accordingly, 
PruneYard is simply not broad enough to apply in the context of the Internet, 
especially because a webpage is privately owned property virtually clustered closely 
together with other pages. 
Where a government acts to regulate privately owned webpages, judicial 
economy also becomes an issue. Because the Internet contains millions of 
webpages,145 numerous situations would be created similar to the one presented in 
PruneYard where a state regulates private property rights of website providers.146 If a 
state were to regulate the content of privately owned webpages, it would have such a 
universal effect that scores of regulated website providers could seek relief based 
upon a violation of their property rights under the Takings Clause. Due to the 
 
 137. See infra Part III.C.2. 
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simple observation that Internet webpages are so numerous, courts would likely 
have to expend substantial time and resources to address the multitude of suits by 
website providers seeking to receive compensation for a regulation of the content of 
their webpages. In short, states should not over-regulate webpages because doing so 
would constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 
C. Privately Owned Websites and the Fifth Amendment 
 
Because there is a structural lack of a “town square” on a webpage,147 and 
considering PruneYard is a limited holding, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
protects a website provider’s property interests in its webpage. Some courts do not 
recognize a taking when a private property owner loses a property right merely by 
any act of the government that affects the website provider.148 Thus, website owners 
still have the burden to show a taking has occurred that requires just compensation. 
This section addresses several key public policies favoring recognition of a Fifth 
Amendment taking in the context of regulations of an Internet webpage. 
1. The Argument Against Recognizing Property Rights in Webpages Under the Fifth 
Amendment 
The government could argue that the Takings Clause provides no protection to the 
website provider. In order to show that a government action is an unlawful taking 
of private property, the property owner must show that it would be unfair and 
unjust for it to bear the burden when the public should bear it.149 This analysis 
requires a consideration of “such factors as the character of the governmental 
action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed 
expectations.”150 Further, when the property owner operates in a highly regulated 
industry like telecommunications, it should expect to be affected by government 
action.151 Based upon these factors, a government could argue that the website 
provider is not deprived of its private property by regulation of a webpage. 
The argument would be based upon many of the same principles used by the 
Court in PruneYard. Specifically, a website provider might implement personal 
restrictions on the “time, place, and manner” with which a regulation is complied 
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to “minimize any interference with its commercial functions.”152 Under those 
circumstances, a virtual invasion of the website provider’s private property is not 
determinative.153 Similarly, the right to exclude in the Internet website context may 
not be completely essential to the webpage’s business expectation.154 To the 
contrary, the website providers—especially those operating a business—likely want 
as many visitors and as much of their input as possible to maximize their profits, 
which is best effectuated by narrow regulations. Under the foregoing analysis, one 
could certainly posit that the Fifth Amendment provides little protection to website 
providers, even those conducting online businesses. 
2. The Argument for Recognizing Property Rights in Webpages Under the Fifth 
Amendment 
Despite the argument against recognizing property rights in webpages under the 
Fifth Amendment, which is supported by PruneYard155 and other cases,156 states 
should consider public policies favoring recognition of property rights when 
analyzing the Takings Clause in the context of webpages. The following two public 
policies are most important: (1) the possibility of harm to the website provider’s 
personal and business interests; and (2) the high value of Internet webpages to the 
website provider.157 A website provider may have a claim for just compensation for a 
taking in contravention to the Fifth Amendment if a state fails to recognize these 
policies by implementing regulations that mandate modification of webpage 
content.158 
From a business expectation standpoint, website providers may suffer economic 
harm from a decrease in their business reputation if a state forces them to modify 
their content. This could occur in two alternative scenarios. First, website providers 
could lose business goodwill if potential customers or users cease visiting the 
webpage due to unsavory material or information displayed on the computer 
screen.159 Uninhibited exposure to potentially volatile or indecent information has 
serious results for both website providers160 and innocent Internet users.161 Unlike 
 
 152. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83. 
 153. Id. at 84. 
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 156. See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 428 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 157. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, Co., 467 U.S. 985, 1005 (1984). 
 158. Cf. id. 
 159. See, e.g., America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452–53 (E.D. Va. 1998) (affirming a 
grant of summary judgment for trespass to chattels where the plaintiff alleged that its business goodwill was 
injured when the defendant sent large amounts of spam to the plaintiff’s subscribers using the plaintiff’s 
computer equipment and network). 
 160. See, e.g., id. (finding that injury to business goodwill was sufficient harm to state a claim for trespass to 
chattels). 
 161. Cf., e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (noting that a broadcast is intrusive and 
“uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read”). 
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patrons at the mall in PruneYard who can perceive the presence of the students and 
take actions to avoid them, an Internet user cannot as easily avoid being exposed to 
content on a webpage. In other words, Internet users make up a captive audience. 
Where a state mandates addition of content to a webpage, the Internet user cannot 
avoid seeing the information on the page. If the website provider is not allowed to 
control that information and perhaps censure it, Internet users wishing to avoid 
vulgar, obscene, or politically charged material could not do so because they would 
immediately be exposed to it upon visiting the website. 
Second, certain Internet users may wish to view particular information, even if it 
is politically charged or vulgar. Where a state mandates removal of such content, 
the website provider is deprived of potential financial gains from purchases of its 
products and services or advertisers wishing to capitalize on a higher volume of 
viewers with specific interests. Website providers—especially those offering services 
or selling goods—should be allowed to control material or information in order to 
protect their business reputations. Indeed, too much regulation could stifle Internet 
commerce if a user quits visiting a particular webpage due to state-mandated 
modification, transforming the webpage from an unconventional webpage into a 
more mainstream webpage. 
Moreover, a website provider has a substantial financial investment in his 
webpage.162 Domain names, for example, are often worth millions of dollars.163 For 
example, “business.com” sold for well over $7 million.164 Domain names, however, 
would be worthless without their connections to webpages. When a website 
provider registers a domain name and creates a webpage, the provider reasonably 
expects profits to stem from the content of that webpage based on its initial 
investment.165 Where a website provider is deprived of the full use of that 
investment, a taking should be recognized, much like the Court recognized a literal 
taking in PruneYard.166 This deprivation should not be tolerated in light of the 
oftentimes large investments website providers make to acquire their domain 
names and then to create a webpage that corresponds to the valuable virtual 
location.167 Recognition of a website provider’s private property interest in his or her 
Internet website would allow the provider to control the information on its 
webpage and fully capitalize on its investment. Basic recognition of these market 
principles will maximize the investment potential of Internet webpages, and this 
recognition eliminates the need for a state to regulate webpage content. 
 
 162. See generally Heussner, supra note 70; Snow, supra note 69, at 50–51 (discussing the values of domain 
names). 
 163. Heussner, supra note 70. 
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 165. See generally supra notes 77–89 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between the 
domain name and the webpage). 
 166. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980). 
 167. Cf. Mossoff, supra note 49, at 41. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
While courts have yet to decide whether a webpage itself is property,168 they have 
determined that website servers and domain names are property.169 Accordingly, the 
public policies behind the common law actions of trespass to chattels and 
conversion necessitate a finding that webpages are the private personal property of 
the website providers.170 Courts often go to great lengths to make these causes of 
action fit within the realm of cyberspace, even where all the elements of the actions 
are only marginally met.171 Against the backdrop of these policies and analyses, a 
website provider should be able to use and dispose of its webpage content as it sees 
fit.172 Moreover, the high value of a webpage and substantial investment a website 
provider makes in that webpage inherently serve as the financial policies behind 
recognition of property interests in the webpage.173 
These private property interests would be unduly burdened by government 
regulation. The Supreme Court in PruneYard held that a state government could 
exercise its police powers to regulate private property with a public character, and 
some scholars argue that such regulations should be implemented in the context of 
the Internet to protect free speech.174 Doctrines created with physical space in mind, 
however, should not be lightly applied in the context of the Internet due to the 
technological realities surrounding a webpage.175 Moreover, the PruneYard Court 
limited its holding, expressly saying that regulations should not amount to a taking 
under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.176 With this principle in mind, 
government regulation of Internet webpage content would amount to a taking 
under the Takings Clause.177 Government action to regulate webpage content has a 
direct economic impact on a website provider due to the interference with the 
website provider’s reasonable business expectations.178 Similarly, website providers 
should be able to protect their financial investments through property principles by 
controlling the content of their webpages to maximize profitability.179 
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